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NOT JUST DOCTRINE:




The legal status of international human rights litigation under
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been the subject of much debate,
culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). The debate has been almost ex-
clusively doctrinal and has focused on the Judiciary Act of 1789,
the historical treatment of the law of nations as general or fed-
eral common law, the evolution of the Supreme Court's
international law jurisprudence, and the integration of custom-
ary international law (CIL) into the domestic legal system.
This Article argues that the focus on doctrine masks underlying
international relations theory assumptions that are the true mo-
tivations of the federal incorporation of CIL and international
human rights litigation under the ATS. One cannot evaluate the
desirability of the federal incorporation of CIL and international
human rights litigation in U.S. courts without having a theory of
the operation of the international system, the motivation for
state behavior in international politics, and the efficacy of inter-
national law as a coercive instrument. Proponents of the federal
incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation
implicitly rely on social constructivism, democratic peace the-
ory, and institutionalism-international relations theories that
motivate a universalist theory of international law.
The universalist theory holds that international law has an inde-
pendent, exogenous affect on state behavior Since States obey
international law out of legal obligation, universalists tend to
encourage the greater integration of CIL into domestic legal re-
gimes and the use of CIL to improve human rights practices
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around the world. Therefore, the desirability and efficacy of the
federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights liti-
gation under the ATS depends on the explanatory power of
specific international relations theories and the strength of the
universalist theory as the appropriate conception of interna-
tional law.
This Article directly engages the universalist theory of interna-
tional law and the underlying international relations
assumptions upon which proponents of federal incorporation
and international human rights litigation under the ATS rely.
The Article examines a competing international relations theory
and alternative conception of international law that views com-
pliance as a function of state interests rather than of legal
obligation. Working from this perspective, the Article provides a
framework to evaluate the desirability of the federal incorpora-
tion of CIL and international human rights litigation in U.S.
courts.
The Article concludes that international human rights litigation
under the current legal regime would likely complicate the
achievement of the United States' normative and strategic for-
eign policy goals. Given the executive's institutional
competencies, constitutional prerogatives and resource advan-
tages, it is the branch best-placed to determine whether
international human rights litigation will assist or hinder the
United States'foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the Article
suggests that a modest shift along the continuum of existing ju-
dicial deference to the executive branch-perhaps in the form of
judicial review of executive determinations on specific litigation
under an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion or rea-
sonableness standard-is warranted for international human
rights litigation under the ATS.
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INTRODUCTION
The logic of federal incorporation of customary international law
(CIL) and international human rights litigation in United States courts
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) implicitly relies on a universalist the-
ory of international law. According to this view, international law has an
exogenous effect on state behavior. States do not comply with interna-
tional law out of pure self-interest; rather, States comply with
international law out of legal or moral obligation. Based on this assump-
tion, universalists naturally promote the development of a global judicial
system, the greater integration of international law into domestic legal
Fall 20071
Michigan Journal of International Law
regimes, and the use of international law to improve human rights prac-
tices around the world. The federal incorporation of CIL and
international human rights litigation in U.S. courts are extensions of the
universalist project.
This Article challenges the universalist theory of international law
upon which federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights
litigation rely. It unpacks the international relations (IR) theory para-
digms that support the universalist theory, and discusses a competing
theory that views state compliance with international law as a function of
national self-interest. Working from this perspective, it proposes a
framework to evaluate the wisdom of federal incorporation of CIL and
the wisdom of international human rights litigation. The framework sug-
gests that federal incorporation of CIL generates sovereignty costs for
the United States, and that international human rights litigation compli-
cates the achievement of the United States' normative and strategic
foreign policy interests. The Article also shows that the universalist the-
ory of international law is often in tension with actual state behavior in
international politics.
The universalist theory draws from IR theories that focus on the role
of regime type, institutions, and social norms in understanding interna-
tional politics. Democratic peace theory, institutionalism, and social
constructivism each implicitly assume that international law has the ca-
pacity to affect state behavior. According to these IR theories,
international law can encourage respect for legal norms, limit the return
to material power in international politics, and operate as an instrument
of progressive change. The wisdom of federal incorporation of CIL and
international human rights litigation depends on the explanatory power
of IR theories and the strength of the universalist theory as the appropri-
ate conception of international law.
Despite the clear attraction of these normative goals, the universalist
theory relies on IR theories that often fail to recognize some of the con-
straints under which the United States operates in international politics.
For example, although democratic peace theory and social constructiv-
ism may explain some state behavior in international politics, the United
States also pursues its foreign policy goals in an international system
constituted by States sensitive to the distribution of material power, con-
cerned with issues of national security, suspicious of international law,
and often motivated by national self-interest. In other words, realism also
explains some state behavior in international politics. This reality natu-
rally produces a tension between the assumptions motivating the
universalist theory and the actual behavior of States. By viewing federal
incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation in U.S.
[Vol. 29:1
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courts solely through a universalist lens, one misses their potential costs
for the United States.
Examining federal incorporation of CIL and international human
rights litigation from a non-universalist perspective contributes to the
discussion about the proper role of international law in the American
legal system. The United States' relationship with international law is
largely based on national self-interest, evolving with the United States'
relative position and strategic goals in international politics. Working
from a non-universalist perspective, this Article connects a plausible IR
theory of state behavior in international politics with a theory of state
compliance with international law to evaluate the consequences of fed-
eral incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation under
the ATS.'
Perhaps most important, this approach engages the first principles
that motivate arguments in support of federal incorporation of CIL and
continued international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. One's
view of the appropriate treatment of CIL within the American legal sys-
tem is linked to IR assumptions about the operation of the international
system, the role of international law in international politics, and the ef-
ficacy of international law as a coercive instrument. From a universalist
perspective, these assumptions militate in favor of the greater integration
of CIL, continued international human rights litigation under the ATS,
and a preference for the judiciary over the executive in determining the
optimal relationship between international law and the American legal
system. These assumptions, however, are often unchallenged in interna-
tional law scholarship. This Article directly engages the implicit IR
assumptions that underlie the doctrinal debate.
Finally, this argument does not constitute a rejection of the broader
universalist project to fight human rights violations around the world.
The improvement of the human condition is of the highest importance.
Understanding the operation of the international system and the nature of
state compliance with international law will only help in creating the
proper institutional arrangements to increase respect for international
law in the world community.
1. Curtis Bradley addresses the potential for increased friction with American foreign
policy as one of the costs of expanded international human rights litigation. See Curtis A.
Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHIi. J. INT'L L. 457 (2001).
However, Bradley does not directly engage the underlying assumptions about state behavior
and international law that provide the theoretical foundation for federal incorporation of CIL
and international human rights litigation under the ATS. Phillip Trimble focuses on the rise of
international institutions and increasing globalization to evaluate effects on American democ-
racy. See Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of
National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 1944 (1997).
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The argument proceeds in five parts. Part I very briefly outlines the
doctrinal discussion regarding the federal incorporation of CIL and in-
ternational human rights litigation in U.S. courts. Part II explores the IR
theories that motivate the universalist theory, and connects them to ar-
guments supporting federal incorporation of CIL and international
human rights litigation under the ATS. Part I develops the argument by
(1) providing a competing theory of state compliance with international
law based on national self-interest, and (2) presenting a framework to
evaluate the potential consequences of federal incorporation of CIL and
international human rights litigation. Part IV discusses the possibility of
international human rights litigation producing a nationalist backlash in
targeted States. Part V addresses counter-arguments. I conclude with a
brief discussion of my argument's implications for the allocation of deci-
sionmaking authority among the branches of government.
I. STATE OF THE DOCTRINE: FEDERAL INCORPORATION AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
The appropriate treatment of CIL in the American legal system and
the legitimacy of international human rights litigation through the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) have produced a voluminous literature 2 By way of
background, the ATS states that: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."3 CIL is
the contemporary equivalent of the law of nations and includes interna-
tional human rights law. If CIL possesses domestic legal status as federal
common law through the ATS, an alien would have a cognizable claim in
a U.S. court for a tort committed in violation of international human
rights law.
2. For an overview of the debate before the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), see, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2003); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm
Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAm L. REV. 463
(1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, IIl HARV. L. REV. 1824
(1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Re-
sponse to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAm L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth
Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997); Ernest A. Young, Sorting out the Debate over Customary In-
ternational Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365 (2002). For an earlier statement of the "modem
position," see Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of Inter-
national Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 295 (1994); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United
States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853
(1987); Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555
(1984).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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Debate on the propriety of federal incorporation of CIL and interna-
tional human rights litigation can be divided into two camps: adherents
to the modern position and revisionist scholars. Though this bifurcation
does not capture alternative positions that purport to find a middleS 4
ground between the two perspectives, it helps frame the dominant
themes in the debate.
A. The Modern Position
Proponents of the modem position argue that CIL has domestic legal
status as self-executing federal common law and provides a basis for
international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. "International law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
on it are duly presented for their determination."5 Drawing from this
statement in the Supreme Court's decision in The Paquete Habana, CIL
is properly incorporated as U.S. law and interpreted by the judiciary.
As "part of our law," all CIL has domestic status as federal common
law. The shift from the Swifr6 to Erie7 regimes-requiring federal com-
mon law to have a basis in the Constitution or Congressional action-
does not apply to CIL. Application of Erie to CIL would create the pos-
sibility of multiple inconsistent interpretations of CIL by the states.8
"Any question of applying [CIL] in our courts involves the foreign rela-
tions of the United States and can thus be brought within a federal power
... [and] would be as unsound as it would be unwise to make our state
courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the rules of international
law."9 Therefore, CIL has domestic legal status as federal common law
without federal political branch authorization.
Proponents of federal incorporation of CIL read the Supreme Court's
examination of CIL in Sabbatino'° as further evidence of CIL's status of
federal common law. In Sabbatino, "the Court construed customary in-
ternational law to determine that international law neither compelled nor
required application of the act of state doctrine,"" thus explicitly treating
4. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Consti-
tutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 91
(2004) (outlining an alternative perspective in the debate).
5. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
6. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
7. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that there is no federal
general common law).
8. See Koh, supra note 2, at 1830-34.
9. Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to Interna-
tional Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 743 (1939).
10. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
II. Koh, supra note 2, at 1833 (emphasis added).
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CIL as federal common law for purposes of constitutional interpretation.
The federal incorporation of CIL is consistent with the federal preroga-
tive in foreign affairs and maintains the supremacy and uniformity of
federal common law.'2 For proponents of the modem position, the his-
torical evolution of the "law of nations" doctrine;" the Supreme Court's
international law jurisprudence in the Paquete Habana and Sabbatino;
and the Second Circuit's holding in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala14 demonstrate
that CIL has been appropriately treated as self-executing federal com-
mon law.
B. The Revisionists
Revisionist scholars counter that CIL does not have federal common
law status without ex ante federal political branch approval. 5 They assert
that the modem position reflects "a combination of troubling develop-
ments, including mistaken interpretations of history, doctrinal
bootstrapping by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law and
academic fiat."'6
The law of nations was historically treated as non-federal or "general
law" that U.S. courts applied "in the absence of any particular domestic
authorization unless and until state or federal legislation specified other-
wise."" However, after Erie, new federal common law must derive from
either the U.S. Constitution or Congressional action through a federal
statute. 8 Since incorporation of CIL as federal common law has not been
authorized by either method, both "the modem position's envisioned
application of CIL by the federal judiciary"' 9 and international
human rights litigation, which relies "on the existence of an
12. Id. at 1826.
13. See generally id. at 1830-44.
14. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that federal courts do
not need ex ante Congressional authorization to enforce universally recognized and accepted
CIL rights under the ATS).
15. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation
of International Law, Ill HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith,
Federal Courts]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997)
[hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law].
16. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 15, at 821. For
earlier critiques of the modem position, see, e.g., Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of
Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts,
Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L. L. 1 (1995).
17. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of Interna-
tional Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 323 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley &
Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy].
18. See id. at 324.
19. Id. at 325.
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independently-derived federal common law of international human
rights law,"20 are unconstitutional.
The revisionists also worry about the broader implications of the
modem position. If CIL has domestic legal status as federal common
law, it could presumably "preempt[ ] inconsistent state law pursuant to
the Supremacy Clause ... bind the President under the "Take Care"
Clause of Article II of the Constitution ... [and] supersede[] inconsistent
federal legislation." 2' They conclude that the modem position conflicts
with the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence, 2  traditions of
American representative democracy, and the foreign affairs prerogatives
of the legislative and executive branches of government.
C. The Effect of Sosa on the Incorporation Debate
The Supreme Court entered the federal incorporation debate in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain.23 In 1985, a Mexican drug cartel organized the kid-
napping, torture and murder of an agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency. The DEA believed Dr. Alvarez-Machain provided the agent
with medical treatment to prolong the torture.2 ' A U.S grand jury indicted
Alvarez-Machain, but the Mexican government refused to transfer him
to U.S. custody. The DEA then hired defendant Jose Francisco Sosa-a
bounty hunter-to capture Alvarez-Machain and deliver him to U.S. of-
ficials. Sosa abducted Alvarez-Machain and he was eventually brought
to trial.2"
After a federal district court granted Alvarez-Machain's motion for
acquittal, he successfully filed suit under the ATS alleging that his ab-
duction constituted an arbitrary arrest and a violation of CIL. On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit held that Alvarez-Machain's arbitrary arrest constituted
a violation of CIL and was grounds for a cause of action under the ATS.26
The Supreme Court addressed the ATS's meaning and scope and
concluded that the ATS permitted U.S. courts to hear federal common
law claims based on a small number of CIL violations under specified
conditions.
Although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new
causes of action, the reasonable inference from the historical
20. Id. at 357.
21. Id. at 322-23.
22. For greater discussion of their federalism concerns, see Curtis A. Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998); Jack L. Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1997).
23. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
24. Id. at 697.
25. Id. at 698.
26. Id. at 698-99.
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materials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect
the moment it became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read
as having been enacted on the understanding that the common
law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of
international law violations with a potential for personal liability
at the time. 7
The Court concluded that the substantive evolution of CIL could lead to
new causes of action under the ATS as long as they were sufficiently
specific, universal, and obligatory CIL norms." Alvarez-Machain's arbi-
trary arrest claim-a detention of one day-did not constitute a specific,
universal, and obligatory CIL norm cognizable under the ATS.
Proponents of the modern position read Sosa's authorization of
federal common law claims based on CIL as confirmation that all CIL
possesses domestic legal status as federal common law; that the ATS
itself both creates federal causes of action for CIL violations and per-
mits federal courts to develop new causes of action from evolving CIL
norms; and that federal courts can consider myriad sources of law to
determine the existence of specific, universal, and obligatory CIL
norms." For many scholars, Sosa stands for the triumph of the modern
position over the revisionist critique. 0
Though this doctrinal debate is important, it ignores more powerful
underlying IR assumptions about the operation of the international sys-
tem, the efficacy of international law, and the possibility of an
international judicial system, that both produce the universalist theory
and motivate advocates of federal incorporation of CIL and interna-
tional human rights litigation under the ATS. However, these IR
assumptions and the universalist theory remain unexplored. The fol-
lowing section engages the IR assumptions and the universalist theory
27. Id. at 724.
28. Id. at 732.
29. For a critical summary of the modem position on Sosa, see Curtis A. Bradley, Jack
L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law and the Continuing
Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007). For a more general discussion, see, e.g.,
Harold Hongju Koh, The 2004 Term: The Supreme Court Meets International Law, John W.
Hager Lecture at the University of Tulsa College of Law (Oct. 28, 2004), in 12 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (2004); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts,
57 VAND. L. REV. 2241 (2004).
30. See William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S.
Legal System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87 (2004); Beth
Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: "The Door is Still Ajar" for Human Rights Litigation in
U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533 (2004). For an alternative position, see Bradley, Gold-
smith & Moore, supra note 29; Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known but Now a Door
Ajar: An Overview of the Evolving and Dangerous Role of the Alien Tort Statute in Human
Rights and International Law Jurisprudence, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 103 (2005).
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that encourage the creation of an international system based on the rule
of law and the use of international law as an instrument of progressive
change.
II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND THE UNIVERSALIST
CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Over the past 20 years, the disciplines of IR and international law
have grown closer.' IR is the study of foreign affairs, specifically
focusing on the behavior of States in international politics, the role of
international institutions, and the broader operation of the international
system. Social constructivism, democratic peace theory, and institu-
tionalism are IR paradigms common in international law scholarship"
They underlie the constitutive, identity, and rational choice theories of
state compliance with international law, respectively, and provide the
foundational assumptions that promote the universalist theory.33
A. Social Constructivism
S• 34.
Social constructivism is an approach to IR with two central as-
sumptions: (1) shared ideas form the structure of human organization
and (2) the content of those shared ideas constructs the interests and
31. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Pro-
spectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989) (arguing that lawyers
should consider research methods from political science); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, In-
ternational Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205
(1993) (advocating a closer relationship between international relations theory and interna-
tional law).
32. A full analysis of the IR paradigms-each possessing a breadth, richness, and vari-
ety that warrants extensive discussion-are well beyond the scope of this Article. Similarly, a
comprehensive evaluation of the several theories of state compliance with international law is
a bridge too far. My goal is to provide a sketch of the underlying logic of the IR paradigms to
demonstrate their prominence in international law scholarship and influence on the federal
incorporation and international human rights litigation debates. I necessarily focus on a lim-
ited number of scholars that reflect the contemporary discourse in both IR and international
law scholarship. Although this may simplify the discussion, it permits an analysis of the IR
paradigms and their assumptions about international law.
33. This Article neither formally critiques the internal coherence of the various IR theo-
ries nor tests empirically the capacity of these IR theories to explain state behavior in
international politics. Rather, the Article demonstrates how some IR theories are framed to
produce the universalist theory.
34. Although my discussion centers on the work of Alexander Wendt-one of the most
prominent constructivists in IR theory-there is variance in constructivist theory. For a brief
introduction to social constructivism, see HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY (1977);
MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996); FRIEDRICH
V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS (1989).
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identities of States in the international system. 5 Shared ideas shape
state interests and identities that, in turn, shape state action. The con-
tent of social practices, discourse, and shared ideas motivate state
behavior in the international politics.
The social constructivist paradigm provides the theoretical basis
for transnational legal process theory, a constitutive theory of state
compliance with international law. States comply with international
law through the "interaction, interpretation, and internalization of in-
ternational norms into domestic legal structures. 36 Transnational
litigation encourages the internalization of international legal norms
into domestic legal and political processes and "drive[s] how national
governments conduct their international relations.37 International law
is the mechanism through which international norms are diffused in the
world community. The judiciary is the government organ through
which the norms are embedded into state practice.
B. Democratic Peace Theory
Democratic peace theory38 posits that the absence of war between
democracies results from two factors unique to democratic governance.
First, democracies possess institutional attributes3-responsiveness to
public opinion, separation of powers, and a system of checks and bal-
ances-that constrain decisionmakers and encourage foreign policy
transparency. Second, the norms, values, and culture produced through
democratic governance generate a "democratic" commitment to the
peaceful resolution of political conflicts. Among democracies, regime
type and individual preferences motivate state behavior in international
politics.
35. See ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999);
Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Poli-
tics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992); but see Dale C. Copeland, The Constructivist Challenge to
Structural Realism: A Review Essay, 25 INT'L SEC. 187 (2000).
36. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2649 (1997) (emphasis added).
37. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, Roscoe Pound Lecture at the
University of Nebraska College of Law (Oct. 28, 1994), The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture:
Transnational Legal Process, in 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 199 (1996) (emphasis added).
38. For a discussion on the various strands of democratic peace theory, see, e.g., Mi-
chael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205
(1983); John R. O'Neal & Bruce M. Russett, The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of De-
mocracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992, 52 WORLD POL. 1
(1994); John M. Owen, How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace, 19 INT'L SEC. 87
(1994); but see Christopher Layne, Kant or Can't: The Myth of the Democratic Peace, 19
INT'L SEC. 5 (1994); David E. Spiro, The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace, 19 INT'L SEC.
50(1994).




Democratic peace theory animates identity theories of state com-
pliance with international law. Regime type-a State's identity as
liberal or nonliberal--determines whether a State will comply with
international law. Within the zone of liberal States, States have a simi-
lar commitment to representative government, separation of powers,
equality of all citizens under law, and basic human rights guarantees. 
°
These institutional attributes predispose liberal States--democracies-
to comply with international law.
C. Institutionalism
Institutionalist 4' or regime 42 theory argues that institutions can fa-
cilitate rational, self-interested cooperation among States with common
political and economic interests. Institutions reduce the two main obsta-
cles to cooperation-information asymmetries and uncertainty-through
increased information and transparency, lower transaction costs, and be-
havior standards to evaluate reputation.43
By facilitating cooperation among rational actors, institutionalism
produces rational choice theories of state compliance with institutional
rules and international law. States are pushed to comply because they
fear reciprocal noncompliance, high reputation costs to defecting from
accepted legal norms, and the prospect of retaliation by other States."
Therefore, States can pursue their rational self-interests and international
law can exert an exogenous effect on state behavior.
The rise of social constructivism, institutionalism, and democratic
peace theory within IR generally coincides with political and structural
changes in the international system. For many, the collapse of the Soviet
Union; the rise of democratic governments in Eastern Europe, Latin
America, and East Asia; and the emergence of U.S. unipolar dominance
of international politics suggest that the Kantian world of liberal States is
40. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal
States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (1995).
41. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Robert 0. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of
Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT'L SEC. 39 (1995); but see John J. Mearsheimer, The False
Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L SEC. 5 (1994). For an extended discussion of
institutionalist or regime theory, see, e.g., COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (Kenneth A. Oye
ed., 1986); INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen Krasner ed., 1983).
42. Institutions or regimes are considered "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms,
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given
area of international relations." See KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 41, at 57 (inter-
nal quotation omitted).
43. Id. at 94.
44. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY (2008).
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increasingly possible.45 These changes provide an opportunity for the
United States to change fundamentally the nature of international poli-
tics and to use its influence to promote democracy, universal human
rights, and multilateralism, resulting in an international system based on
the rule of law.
D. The Universalist Theory of International Law
Embedded in this broader international political context and influ-
enced by specific IR theories, modern scholars have developed a general
universalist theory of state compliance with international law. The uni-
versalist theory relies on the IR assumptions of social constructivism,
institutionalism, and democratic peace theory. These IR theories share
two attributes. First, the theories reject the role of power and self-interest
as causal variables to explain state behavior and, in the case of institu-
tionalism, suggest that institutions can minimize the pernicious effects of
the pursuit of national self-interests and encourage cooperation. Second,
each theory produces similar conclusions about the capacity of interna-
tional law to affect state behavior. Constitutive, rational choice, and
identity theories of state compliance lead to the proposition that interna-
tional law has an independent, exogenous effect on state behavior.4
6
Through the development of an international judicial system,1 inter-
national law can create a constitutional order in international politics and
operate as an instrument of progressive change. State compliance with
international law invites greater coordination among judicial bodies,
harmonization of international legal rules, and integration of interna-
tional law into the American legal system-the federal incorporation of
CIL.
Table 1 illustrates the connection between IR theories about the op-
eration of international politics and the universalist theory of
international law:
45. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
46. See Koh, supra note 36. Although there are many theories to explain why states
obey international law, scholars agree that international law constrains state action.
47. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create Interna-
tional Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005);
Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003);




UNIVERSALIST THEORY AND IR
Social Democratic
IR Theory Constructivism Peace Theory Institutionalism
Motivation for State Norms, Ideas, Regime Type (among Interests (checked by
Behavior Discourse Democracies) Information, Reputation
Costs & Reduction of
Uncertainty
State Compliance with Yes, through Norm Yes, among Yes, through Self-
International Law out of Internalization Democracies because Interest within
Moral or Legal of Institutional Institutional Framework
Obligation Attributes and Liberal
Culture
International Law Yes, depending on Yes, among Yes, within Institutional
Constrains States and Dominant Norm Democracies Framework
has Independent Effect
on State Behavior
Given state compliance with international law, scholars envisage it
as an instrument to regulate domestic affairs. Traditionally, international
law has regulated state-to-state relations to maintain international order.
The Concert of Nations, the League of Nations, and the United Nations
were all conceived as institutions to regulate the political and security
affairs of their respective Member States. In the mid-twentieth century,
States began to use international law more aggressively to regulate State-
to-citizen relations through international human rights law.48
For many scholars, international human rights litigation vindicates
the rights of individuals, exposes egregious human rights practices, and
punishes violators of international human rights law. It contributes to the
socialization of States and acculturation of individuals, leading to the
adoption of shared values throughout the international community.49 The
universalist theory produces a normative project to judicialize interna-
tional politics, integrate international law into domestic legal systems,
and promote progressive change. The federal incorporation of CIL and
international human rights litigation are necessary for the realization of
these goals.
48. See generally Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The
Challenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211 (1991); Louis B. Sohn, The New Interna-
tional Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1
(1982).
49. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004).
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III. A NEW FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE FEDERAL INCORPORATION
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
Suppose that the operation of the international system does not al-
ways reflect the assumptions of social constructivism, democratic peace
theory, and institutionalism. Suppose further that the United States'
compliance with international law does not always reflect legal or moral
obligation. If these suppositions are accurate, evaluating the federal in-
corporation of CIL and international human rights litigation solely
through the lens of a universalist theory of international law will produce
an inaccurate understanding of their consequences for the United States.
This section develops my framework for evaluating federal incorpo-
ration of CIL and international human rights litigation by examining the
role of power and self-interest in international politics. If these factors
play a role in motivating state behavior in international politics, they
might contribute to our understanding of state behavior in international
politics and state compliance with international law.
A. Realism
Realism focuses on the balance of power among States and the pur-
suit of economic and military strength to ensure security in international
politics. Although there are variants of realist thought, realism relies on
three core assumptions.0 First, realism assumes that States operate in an
international system without a central enforcement mechanism to regu-
late state behavior-an international system in which there is no global
policeman to restrain powerful States from coercing weaker States. Sec-
ond, security is the primary state goal. Since States desire "to maintain
their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political
order,"'" they focus on developing military strength and economic re-
sources relative to other States.52 Third, realism assumes that States are
50. There is significant variation in realist theories. See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE
TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NA-
TIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1985); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). To introduce realism as a paradigm, I focus on the three
bedrock assumptions that are most instructive. For challenges to realism, see ROBERT 0.
KEOHANE, NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (1986); Robert Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, and
Cooperation, 24 INT'L SEC. 42 (1999); Jeffrey W. Legro & Andrew Moravscik, Is Anybody
Still a Realist?, 24 INT'L SEC. 5 (1999) (questioning the coherence of realist thought, noting
the analytical difficulties that some neorealists have encountered in trying to explain recent
phenomena in international politics); Richard Rosecrance, Has Realism Become Cost-Benefit
Analysis?, 26 INT'L SEC. 132 (2001).
51. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 50, at 31.
52. See id. at 55; WALTZ, supra note 50, at 131.
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rational actors. Norms, institutions, and regime type have little effect on
state behavior.
Given these assumptions, realists do not develop a theory of state
compliance with international law. For them, the content of international
law reflects the underlying distribution of power in international politics
and represents the interests of the powerful States. "Most international
law is obeyed most of the time, but strong States bend or break law when
they choose to."53
B. International Law and State Interests
In an international system focused on power, state compliance with
CIL is a "function of national self-interest."54 "International law emerges
from States' pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage.
[It] is ... endogenous to state interests. It is not a check on state self-
interest; it is a product of state self-interest."55
State behavior consistent with CIL reflects four "behavioral logics":
cooperation, coordination, coincidence of interest, and coercion. Coop-
eration derives from bilateral repeat prisoner's dilemma interactions
based on four conditions: (1) States have low discount rates; (2) indefi-
nite duration of interactions; (3) the payoff from defection must not
dramatically exceed the payoff from cooperation; and (4) cooperative
moves are clearly defined 6 For coordination, "each State's best move
depends on the move of the other State. 57
However, in repeat prisoner's dilemma interactions, the necessary
conditions for cooperation and coordination are hard to maintain. As ad-
ditional States participate, the cost of monitoring and the possibilities of
erroneous punishment and potential free-riding increase. Cooperation
and coordination are unlikely to produce state action consistent with
CIL.
State "compliance" with CIL is actually a product of coercion or co-
incidence of interest. Coincidence of interest represents behavior in
which each State "obtains private advantages from a particular action...
irrespective of the action of the other."59 Both actors gain through the
53. Kenneth N. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, in AMERICA UNRIVALED:
THE FUTURE OF THE BALANCE OF POWER 29, 51 (G. John Ikenberry ed., 2002).
54. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law,
66CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1120 (1999).
55. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
13(2005).
56. See id. at 36.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 54, at 1122.
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pursuit of their respective self-interest. Coercion occurs when a State or
group of States with common interests "forces other States to engage in
actions that serve the interest[s] of the first State or [group of] States."0
In both cases, state behavior consistent with CIL would be a product of
national self-interest, not legal obligation.
A more prominent role for power and national self-interest in inter-
national politics leads to two conclusions about the efficacy of
international law as a coercive instrument. First, since compliance with
international law reflects coercion or coincidence of interest, it is
unlikely that international law independently affects state behavior. Sec-
ond, since international law has little independent effect on state
behavior, an international judicial system to regulate international politi-
cal affairs will be ineffective, by itself, to constrain States. These two
conclusions challenge the universalist theory. Table 2 compares realism




IRTheory Constructivism PeaceTheory Institutionalism Realism
Motivation for State Norms, Ideas, & Regime Type Interests (checked Security
Behavior Discourse (among by Information,
Democracies) Reputation Costs &
Reduction of
Uncertainty
Possible State Yes, through Norm Yes, among Yes, within No. State Behavior
Compliance with Internalization Democracies Institutional Consistent with
International Law because of Framework International Law
out of Moral or Institutional reflects State Self-
Legal Obligation Attributes and Interest
Liberal Culture
International Law Yes, depending on Yes, among Yes, through No.
Constrains States Dominant Norm Democracies Reputation Costs,
and has Fear of Retaliation
Independent Effect and Reciprocal
on State Behavior Non-compliance
60. Id. at 1123.
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C. The Wisdom of Federal Incorporation and International
Human Rights Litigation
Arguments in support of federal incorporation of CIL and
international human rights litigation reflect the universalist theory and
the assumptions of social constructivism, democratic peace theory, and
institutionalism. In contrast, this section provides a framework for
evaluating federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights
litigation that takes into account factors that the universalist theory fails
to consider: the value of sovereignty; the distribution of power in the
international system; the methodology and content of international law;
the structural trends in international politics; and complementarity with
the normative and strategic goals of American foreign policy. This
framework produces a set of conclusions about the proper relationship
between international law and the American legal system and the
consequences of federal incorporation of CIL and international human
rights litigation.
1. Sovereignty
The framework starts with the assumption that States value sover-
eignty: the autonomy of the political order premised on "the exclusion of
external actors from domestic authority structures" 6' within its recog-
nized territory. This Westphalian conception of sovereignty coexists with
international legal sovereignty, "the practices associated with mutual
recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical
independence. ' '6 Clearly, the concept of sovereignty is malleable, as his-
tory is replete with instances of powerful States violating the sovereignty
of weaker States-colonialism, for example-and imposing external
political orders. I do not claim that States have always respected West-
phalian or international legal sovereignty. I do not deny that States often
cede aspects of their sovereignty for instrumental reasons. My claim is
much more limited and uncontroversial: States value their capacity to
exclude external actors from their recognized territory, maintain an
autonomous domestic political order, and pursue their interests unen-
cumbered by external political constraints. Working from this
assumption, it is unlikely that self-interested States sensitive to the dis-
tribution of power in the international system would cede sovereignty
over a particular aspect of their domestic political order for non-
instrumental reasons.
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY, 20 (1999).
Id. at 3.
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2. Power in International Politics.
States operate in an international system with national security as
their primary objective.63 Although States may have a number of inter-
ests-the promotion of rule of law, universal human rights or
democracy-States tend to prioritize security concerns. To achieve some
level of security, States pursue material power: military strength and
economic development.6 This does not mean that the pursuit of a State's
normative interests could not, at times, help achieve security or strategic
goals. It simply means that States are sensitive to shifts in their relative
65power positions.
A State's material power influences its relationship with interna-
tional law. The international system lacks a central enforcement
mechanism to enforce international law. In this environment, States can
comply with international law when it is in their interests to do so. But
what does that tell us about the enforcement of international law? Few
States have the material power act as a global policeman, enforcing in-
ternational law and coercing state compliance. Those States that do-the
great powers-are rational, self-interested actors that also enforce inter-
national law according to their self-interests.
Similarly, great powers are the only States that have the capacity to
comply selectively or resist international law. In both instances, the
State's relative power is the key variable; it allows a powerful State both
to enforce international law on weak States and to resist the imposition
of international law by others. 66
For a weak State, the sovereignty cost67 of incorporation is low. If the
great powers choose to impose their conception of international law,
weak States lack the material capacity to resist. The forced integration of
international law into its domestic legal structure is more likely.
As a State's power increases, the sovereignty costs of incorporation
increase proportionally. At the same time, powerful States have the ca-
pacity to enforce and comply selectively with international law. In a
world with no central enforcement mechanism, powerful States have a
63. See generally MEARSHEIMER, supra note 50; WALTZ, supra note 50.
64. See generally MEARSHEIMER, supra note 50; WALTZ, supra note 50.
65. See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of
the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485 (1988); but see Duncan A. Snidal,
Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation, 85 AM. POL. Scd. REV. 3 (1991).
66. See Nico Krisch, International Law in 7imes of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the
Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 3 (2005).
67. I am focused on the sovereignty costs of incorporation of international law when,
given a particular distribution of power, a State has the capacity to comply selectively with
international law. For a discussion of the sovereignty costs of delegation to an international
authority or to an international judge, see Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights
Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217 (2000).
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greater capacity to resist international law that is contrary to their inter-
ests. Since States generally value sovereignty, it makes little sense for a
powerful State to impose on itself-or to incorporate-a body of law
that potentially contravenes that State's normative or strategic interests
when there is no external actor capable of doing so. Unless international
law consistently reflects the content of a powerful State's domestic law, 
6
that State incurs a high sovereignty cost to incorporation.
This cost is increased for the United States. The United States' po-
litical, economic,69 and military0 dominance of international politics; the
unipolar structure of the international system;7 and the United States'
capacity to comply with and enforce international law consistent with its
interests suggests that the sovereignty cost of incorporating international
law will be higher than the cost to any other State in the international
system. On these grounds alone, the United States should be most cir-
cumspect about incorporating international law. In many ways, the
United States has a greater capacity to act unilaterally and deviate from
norms of international law that are in opposition to U.S. interests 72
To this point, I have discussed the role of power in terms of en-
forcement and compliance with international law. The role of power also
plays a significant role in the creation of international law. If a powerful
State can shape the content of international law ex ante, it is much more
likely to reflect that particular State's interests, lowering the sovereignty
cost of incorporation. This places considerable importance on the meth-
odology underlying the creation of international law.
68. It is unlikely that international law will always represent the interests of a specific
State over a long period of time. The dynamic nature of international politics, the shifts in the
distribution of power in the international system, and political and military conflict all suggest
that powerful States will rise and fall, with new powers emerging. Therefore, the content of
international law will necessarily evolve to reflect the emergence of new powers and possibly
conflict with the interests of any one state.
69. "For the past century, the U.S. share of gross world product was often double (or
more) the share of any other state: 32 percent in 1913, 31 percent in 1938, 26 percent in 1960,
22 percent in 1980, and 27 percent in 2000." Robert A. Pape, Soft Balancing against the
United States, 30 INT'L SEC. 7, 18 (2005).
70. For a discussion of the United States' material dominance of the international sys-
tem, see Barry R. Posen, Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S.
Hegemony, 28 INT'L SEC. 5 (2003).
71. See, e.g., Michael Mastaduno, Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories
and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War, 21 INT'L SEC. 49 (1997); William C. Wohlforth,
The Stability of a Unipolar World, 24 INT'L SEC. 5 (1999).
72. This is a descriptive point only. Although the United States may have this capacity,
there are certainly situations in which cooperation is preferable. My only point is to show that
the United States, like other strong states, has a greater capacity to develop its own path and
pursue national interests than weak states.
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3. Methodology and Content of Customary International Law
a. CIL
International law is composed of treaties and CIL. Treaties are
agreements between and among States on particular issues. CIL repre-
sents the norms of international law. The critical elements in determining
the content of CIL are state practice and opinio juris. State practice re-
fers to the widespread and consistent practice of States, slowly
crystallizing over time into custom. Opinio juris refers to the belief that
the norm determined by state practice should be obeyed as a matter of
law. Traditionally, CIL's content regulated the state-to-state relationships
of internationally recognized sovereign nations and, although there are
some exceptions, ignored the internal domestic relationship between the
sovereign and the citizen. CIL governed interstate relations, focusing on
the relationships between sovereign States for the maintenance of inter-
national order.
CIL's methodology has been criticized on several grounds. There is
no universal, common understanding on what constitutes state practice
or even evidence of state practice. Most States, including the United
States, do not publish information on their respective state practices. 3
Although the registry of the International Court of Justice publishes a list
of documents that constitute evidence of state practice,74 it does not for-
mally investigate state attitudes on a purported customary international
law norm or empirically measure state practices to determine widespread
or consistent practice.7 ' Finally, there is no agreed-upon interpretive
method to evaluate evidence of state practice or define widespread and
consistent practice.76
Scholars also focus on the analytical problem in distinguishing state
compliance with CIL based on legal obligation-opiniojuris-from state
compliance based on coercion or self-interest. The test is circular; state
practice evidences opinio juris, while the legal obligation inherent in
73. See Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary Interna-
tional Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 144 (1995).
74. See International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/ (last visited May 13,
2008).
75. See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529
(1993).
76. Compare Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18)
(stating that in determining state practice, a few inconsistencies in understanding a given rule
should not affect determinations of widespread and consistent state practice), with Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
(stating that while absolute or perfect consistency with a rule is not required, state behavior
inconsistent with a particular rule of international law should generally be considered as a
breach of that rule).
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opinio juris is reflected by state practice. In an international system
without a central enforcement mechanism, it is exceedingly difficult to
distinguish between compliance based on opinio juris and compliance
based on coercion, presumed consent or acquiescence. Even if this were
possible, how does one measure a State's legal obligation? By what
States say? By what States actually do?"
CIL's reliance on state practice as an indicator of custom and opinio
juris does not explain its evolution in content over time. Despite the legal
obligation inherent in CIL, States must violate CIL to develop new CIL
norms. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between state violations of
existing CIL-failure to comply-from state violations of existing CIL
for the purpose of creating new CIL norms.
These critiques demonstrate CIL's methodological inconsistencies
and manipulable content. Given the doctrinal subjectivity inherent in the
CIL's methodology, it generally represents the state practice, customs,
and strategic interests of the only actors in the international system ca-
pable of developing and enforcing CIL: the great powers. As I discussed
earlier, since the United States and other great powers are the only States
that possess the material power to enforce CIL, they have clear incen-
tives to engage in self-interested enforcement. They can coerce
compliance with CIL from weak States and, since there is no central en-
forcement mechanism, engage in low cost violations of CIL.
If the powerful States determine the content of CIL and they are the
only States capable of enforcing it, they should not-fear federal incorpo-
ration of CIL. Presumably, CIL will generally reflect their interests and
complement their domestic laws. To evaluate this claim, I discuss the
shift in methodology and content of CIL.
b. The New CIL
The modern, or "new," CIL78 challenges the "traditional" CIL para-
digm in methodology, reach, and content. 9 It does not mark the
77. 1 bracket the question about whether States have an overarching moral obligation to
comply. For a discussion of this question, see Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obliga-
tion to Obey International Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1901 (2003).
78. This term was coined by Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith to refer to the
change in reach and content of customary international law. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Cus-
tomary International Law, supra note 15; Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note
15.
79. I do not think there are any scholars who suggest that there is a coherent theory
behind the new CIL that justifies its "methodology." Those who support it think that it is good
because human rights norms can be created more quickly. Those scholars are cited throughout
this section. For criticisms of the new CIL's methodology, see, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric
A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary
International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (2000); Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115 (2005); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of
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emergence of a new body of law; rather the new CIL refers to the evolu-
tion in CIL's content and its new focus on human rights. In contrast to
traditional CIL-a slowly developing body of law governing state-to-
state relations-the new CIL develops rapidly' ° and regulates the rela-
tionship between the State and its citizens. The new CIL is a vehicle for
the promotion of human rights and the basis of international human
rights litigation under the ATS.
While the new CIL is more invasive in reach and content, it lacks a
coherent methodology8' to explain the emergence of new human rights
norms. It moves away from the traditional methodological foundations
of custom and widespread, consistent state practice as sources of CIL
norms. The new CIL "has been established largely by treaty-the U.N.
Charter and international human rights covenants and conventions-but
without any foundation or context of custom.
82
Evidence of new CIL's universal norms is derived from the declara-
tions of various international organizations and conferences,83 national
constitutions,84 the non-binding resolutions of the United Nations, the
writings of academics," and the terms of non-ratified multilateral treaties
that purportedly reflect moral obligation. 6 "[U]nanimous and near-
unanimous declarations of the U.N. General Assembly and other interna-
tional fora constitute a consensus on legal norms providing clear
evidence of the opinio juris of nations. 87 With respect to the new CIL,
"States really never make international law on the subject of human
rights. It is made by people that care; the professors, the writers of text-
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449 (2000); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Tra-
ditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 757 (2001); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559 (2002);
Trimble, supra note 16.
80. "We cannot wait any longer for the ratification by all states because it takes too
long." Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 399, 406
(1996).
81. For an introduction to the methodology of the new CIL, see THEODOR MERON,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 79-135 (1989).
82. Louis Henkin, Sibley Lecture, March 1994: Human Rights and "State Sovereignty",
25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 36 (1996).
83. See Louis B. Sohn, "Generally Accepted" International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV.
1073 (1986).
84. See Henkin, supra note 82, at 40.
85. As Louis Sohn suggests, "This is the way international law is made, not by states,
but by 'silly' professors writing books, and by knowing where there is a good book on the
subject." Sohn, supra note 80, at 401.
86. Proponents look to the terms of unsigned, non-ratified, and agreed treaties, often
ignoring the reservations and opt-outs that states include before signing. See Kelly, supra note
79 (citing Louis B. Sohn, supra note 48).
87. Kelly, supra note 79, at 484.
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books and casebooks, and the authors of articles in leading international
law journals."'n
The new CIL differs from the traditional CIL paradigm in ways that
question the wisdom of federal incorporation of CIL. First, the new CIL
is both methodologically indeterminate and develops rapidly. Although
traditional CIL relied on the subjective legal fiction of state practice, its
norms generally reflected the state practices of great powers. Second, the
new CIL is, paradoxically, also more elite-driven. It is not "elite-driven"
by the few great powers that influenced the traditional CIL framework;
rather, it is elite-driven by international legal scholars, epistemic com-
munities, transgovernmental advocacy networks, and human rights
advocates. By avoiding a connection with state practice, focusing on
elite preferences, and using the ATS as a vehicle to disseminate CIL hu-
man rights norms, the sovereignty costs on receptive States increases-
particularly in democracies-as the imposition of these norms appears
divorced from democratic processes. Although some may find this
change normatively attractive, as a purely descriptive matter the new CIL
is may become less reflective of state interests.
c. The United States and the New CIL
This critique of the new GIL's methodology and content does not
constitute a rejection of the content of international human rights law.
The improvement of human rights practices in the United States and the
international community is an important goal. However, in light of the
sovereignty costs for the United States, the critique simply questions the
logic of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights liti-
gation as the mechanisms to achieve them.
The United States' material power and dominance of international
politics gives it the capacity to influence the development of CIL under
the "traditional" paradigm. However, the new CIL's rejection of custom
and state practice suggests that the new CIL is less likely to represent
U.S. interests, challenging the desirability of federal incorporation of
CIL. Though the United States has a role in the formation of CIL, the
United States seems to recognize the costs of the new CIL phenomenon.
The United States attaches reservations or modifications, or fails to rat-
ify89 many of the international conventions and treaties upon which some
88. Sohn, supra note 83, at 399.
89. See Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 567, 567 (1997).
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CIL norms rely and ignores many social and cultural rights9° listed in the
Restatement.9 '
[The United States] has proven to be a serious laggard in acced-
ing to near universally-adopted international human rights
conventions; where the United States has signed on to such ac-
cords, it has included conditions methodically limiting the scope
of ratification to existing U.S. practice, rendering acceptance a
largely hollow, falsely symbolic act.92
Despite the attraction of these new rights, it is unclear that federal incor-
poration of the new CIL by the judiciary is preferable to their adoption
through the political process, particularly if one assumes that there will
be greater compliance with human rights norms if they are representative
of the will of the people as opposed to imposed by an unelected judici-
ary.
The rapid development and breadth of the new CIL also militates
against federal incorporation. The new CIL "now operates with respect
to such matters as free speech and conscience; the practice of religion;
health care; education, and shelter; social and cultural rights; criminal
law, procedure, and the conditions of incarceration."93 This is not the
limit of new CIL norms: "The Restatement comments that there may be
non-conventional human rights law in addition to that which it was pre-
pared to recognize and restate at the time, and more such law would
doubtless come." 94 While many may find these aspirational norms attrac-
tive, the new CIL's methodology reduces the United States' influence on
its development and content, and increases the likelihood that the new
CIL will conflict with American law and circumvents the American po-
litical process, suggesting that the United States and its citizens should
be increasingly skeptical about the wisdom of federal incorporation of
the new CIL.
90. See Henkin, supra note 82, at 40 (noting that economic and social rights are on the
same plane as civil and political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
91. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82 (1992).
92. Spiro, supra note 89, at 567.
93. Id. at 569.
94. Henkin, supra note 82, at 37-38. The new CIL "is being made, purposefully, know-
ingly, wilfully [sic], and concern for human rights has provided a principal impetus to its
growth, and the law of human rights is a principal impetus to its growth ... " Id. at 37.
[Vol. 29:1I
Not Just Doctrine
4. Trends in International Politics
Recent trends95 suggest that other powerful States will emerge over
the medium-to-long term, influencing the content of the new CIL and
perhaps moving it away from the traditional European and American
foundations upon which it previously relied. Part of the attraction of in-
ternational law in the United States grows from its tradition of
representing the interests of the powerful States in the international sys-
tem-States that, over at least the last three hundred years, have almost
exclusively consisted of the United States and western European nations.
However, the new CIL will not always embody the cultural, moral, nor-
mative, and strategic preferences of Western great powers and political
elites. The new CIL's indeterminate methodology may actually serve to
accelerate this change. It may not be in the United States' strategic or
normative interests to incorporate the new CIL, a body of law that, over
time, may not reflect American values.
Structural changes in the international system further challenge the
wisdom of federal incorporation.96 The collapse of the Soviet Union, the
diminished threat of catastrophic nuclear war, and the decreased impor-
tance of U.S.-European solidarity suggest that the United States and
European powers will increasingly differ on the content of the new CIL.
The Soviet Union's implosion removed the existential threat that bound
the United States and Europe during the Cold War, facilitated the crea-
tion of the European Union, and suppressed security competition on the• 97
continent. Despite the continued presence of U.S. troops in Europe and
the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United
States and the EU are developing different conceptions on the appropri-
ate use of force in international politics, the salience of international
institutions, the importance of multinational treaties and the role of in-
ternational law.98  China's "peaceful rise" is also relevant to
understanding the future content of CIL. Some argue that China's rise
does not threaten the United States and could result in peaceful relations
based on shared economic benefits from trade liberalization and global-
ization.99 China's need to maintain economic growth to ensure domestic
stability, recent willingness to operate within international institutions,
95. See generally Daniel Drenzer, The New New World Order, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 13
(2007).
96. See generally Azar Gat, The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers, 86 FOREIGN
AFF. 59 (2007).
97. See Josef Joffe, Europe's American Pacifier, 54 FOREIGN POL'Y 64 (1984).
98. See ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE
NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
99. See David M. Lampton, China's Rise in Asia Need Not Be at America's Expense, in
POWER SHIFT: CHINA AND ASIA'S NEW DYNAMICS 306 (David Shambaugh ed., 2005).
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and decision to temper anti-United States rhetoric evidence a change in
China's foreign policy goals and suggest that China's rise will be gener-
ally non-threatening and consistent with the current international order.,i °
Others suggest that while China's rise may be peaceful over the
short term, Chinese economic growth, military development, and strate-
gic interests will represent a challenge to U.S. interests and regional
dominance in East Asia.0 ' China has no incentive to challenge the
United States over the short term, while its stellar economic growth con-
tinues and domestic issues-income inequality, environmental
degradation, and rural underdevelopment-require more immediate at-
tention. However, at current growth rates, China will have the world's
largest economy by 2050, giving it the economic and military capacity to
challenge the United States in East Asia over their fundamentally op-
posed strategic interests: China wants to limit the United States'
influence and develop as the dominant power in the region, while the
United States wants to prevent Chinese hegemony in East Asia. °2 As
Chinese power grows, "the US needs to be prepared to renegotiate a host
of important multilateral treaties that a powerful China will not be will-
ing to obey-including, perhaps, human rights treaties"' 3 or, as I argue,
the content of the new CIL.
5. Complementarity with American Foreign Policy
The wisdom of international human rights litigation in U.S. courts
also depends on its relationship with American foreign policy. If the
United States always prioritizes human rights and respect for interna-
tional law as primary objectives-the universalist theory-international
human rights litigation is consistent with and complementary to Ameri-
can foreign policy. However, if the United States pursues its foreign
policy goals in an international system sensitive to power and driven by
national self-interest, international human rights litigation may compli-
cate the achievement of both normative and strategic foreign policy
objectives.
100. See Yong Deng, Better than Power: "International Status" in Chinese Foreign
Policy, in CHINA RISING: POWER AND MOTIVATION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 51 (Yong
Deng & Fei Ling Wang eds., 2005); Lampton, supra note 99; Fei-Ling Wang, Beijing's Incen-
tive Structure: The Pursuit of Prosperity, Preservation and Power, in CHINA RISING: POWER
AND MOTIVATION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 100, at 10.
101. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 50; ROBERT G. SUTTER, CHINA'S RISE IN ASIA:
PROMISES AND PERILS (2005).
102. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 50; SUTTER, supra note 101.
103. Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 1, 9 (2006).
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a. Potential for Conflict
The strategic interests of the United States and the normative inter-
ests of human rights advocates will not always converge. When they
converge, the pursuit of normative goals through international human
rights litigation complements the pursuit of strategic interests. For exam-
ple, the United States' attempts to contain the Soviet Union through the
development of military and economic resources (security interests) and
its opposition to the lack of democracy and basic human rights under
communism (normative interests) satisfied both goals. In other cases,
however, the normative preferences of the litigants and their advocates,
while laudable, may conflict with the United States' strategic interests
and the foreign policy necessary to achieve them.
For example, it is highly questionable that international human rights
litigation or the promotion of democracy in Jordan, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia
will result in regimes that will embrace normative human rights practices.
In fact, it may actually worsen the situation and will likely produce anti-
U.S. regimes-Hamas's victory in the Palestinian elections, for example-
that challenge both the United States' strategic and normative interests.
The key is to recognize that there are costs to binding the United States
to a normative position when, at times, national security or strategic in-
terests may require expediency.
Consider the complicated situation in Pakistan. The military gov-
ernment of Pervez Musharraf was, for the most part, an ally of the
United States during the War on Terror. ' At the same time, Pakistan en-
gaged in a number of practices that violate human rights law. Human
Rights Watch notes:
President Pervez Musharraf's military-backed government did
little in 2006 to address a rapidly deteriorating human rights
situation. Ongoing concerns include arbitrary detention, lack of
due process, and the mistreatment, torture, and "disappearance"
of terrorism suspects and political opponents; harassment and in-
timidation of the media; and legal discrimination against and• •• 105
mistreatment of women and religious minorities.
Arbitrary detention and the disappearance of individuals, for exam-
ple, are violations of CIL and would likely be actionable claims under
the post-Sosa international human rights litigation regime. While no per-
son would condone these practices, the United States has to weigh the
benefits of encouraging democracy and normative human rights
104. 1 take no position on the wisdom or overall efficacy of the so-called War on Terror.
105. Human Rights Watch, Pakistan, WORLD REP. 2007 (Jan. 11, 2007),
http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/I l/pakist14756.htm.
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practices against the costs of failing to achieve national security and stra-
tegic interests in determining the appropriate policies toward Pakistan.
First, Pakistan assists the United States in achieving national security
goals: the elimination of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and the
destruction of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups. Second, Pakistan is a
nuclear power with a divided security apparatus and unclear command
and control procedures over its nuclear arsenal. Destabilizing the regime
may threaten to jeopardize control of Pakistani nuclear weapons and ma-
teriel. Third, and most important, the United States wants stability in
Pakistan. For many American policymakers, a democracy led by the late
Benazhir Bhutto would have been preferable; however, a pro-U.S. gov-
ernment is the priority. To the extent that strategic interests reinforce
normative and strategic goals, policy decisions are easier. But, given the
complex political situation within Pakistan, the results of recent elec-
tions, and the United States' strategic interests, it is still unclear if regime
change will produce a government that will support the United States'
strategic interests and embrace its normative human rights concerns.06
The same difficult balance applies to other countries. For example,
the United States' interest in promoting democracy and human rights in
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, °7 or the Central Asian Republics, among many oth-
ers, has been subordinated to the United States' strategic interest in
maintaining pro-U.S. regimes in these States. Focusing on Egypt:
In 2006 [the United States] provided approximately US$1.3 bil-
lion in military aid and US$490 million in economic assistance
[to Egypt]. In June 2006, the US Congress defeated a proposed
amendment that would have cut $100 million from the US aid
package in response to Egypt's poor human rights record.' 8
During various Republican and Democratic administrations, the United
States has weighed the normative importance of improving human rights
practices in Egypt against the cost of compromising strategic or national
security interests. Most recently, the United States determined that "fac-
106. This discussion is based on the United States' relationship with Pakistan since late
2001. Events that occurred between December 2007 and February 2008, including Bhutto's
return from exile and assassination and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's return to politi-
cal life, as well as continuing developments, complicate any analysis.
107. According to Human Rights Watch, "[a]rbitrary detention, mistreatment and torture
of detainees, restrictions on freedom of movement, and lack of official accountability remain
serious concerns." Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabia, WORLD REP. 2007 (Jan. 11, 2007),
http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/1 l/saudial4717.htm.
108. Human Rights Watch, Egypt, WORLD REP. 2007 (Jan. 11, 2007), http://hrw.org/
englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01 /1 /egypt 14701 .htm.
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ing chaos in Iraq, rising Iranian influence and the destabilizing Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.., stability, not democracy, was its priority."' '
Some may respond that the very goal of international human rights
litigation is to restrain the United States, modify American foreign pol-
icy, and encourage compliance with international human rights law.
During the twentieth century, the United States adopted polices that sup-
ported autocratic dictators around the world and ignored clear human
rights violations by allies. During the Cold War, the United States allied
with anti-Soviet right-wing dictatorships regardless of their human rights
abuses, respect for international law, or commitment to democracy.
American "policymakers adopted a pragmatic rationale for defending
dictatorships they favored, and moral judgments were invoked only
when the [United States] opposed a regime rather than to provide a con-
sistent principle to guide policy and base decisions."" ° The United States
provided economic and military aid to right-wing dictators in Chile,"'
Greece,"' Indonesia,"' the Philippines,"4 the Congo,"' Nicaragua, 6 and
Iran." 7
The United States was also apprehensive about twentieth century
pro-democracy, pro-human rights, and national liberation movements in
Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Despite the rhetoric, "[t]here
was little room for moral arguments against right-wing dictators [for the
United States]. They would be wedged into the free world, no matter
what their record of abuses .... For many, international human rights
109. Michael Slackman, Rice Speaks Softly in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at Al.
110. DAVID F. SCHMITZ, THE UNITED STATES AND RIGHT-WING DICTATORSHIPS 2
(2006).
111. "It was important [the U.S. Ambassador to Chile] continued, that the United States
reject the position that it should follow a policy of noncooperation with [Pinochet] and pres-
sure [him] on human rights." Id. at 104.
112. "[A]II remaining concerns for constitutional government were subordinated to the
desire for stability, American security interests, and anticommunism, as the junta met all the
criteria for American support." Id. at 69.
113. "Suharto's bloody elimination of the Communist Party, enforced stability, and pro-
Western economic and foreign polices earned him American praise and support." Id. at 55.
114. Ferdinand Marcos was "an authoritarian ruler who was anticommunist, protected
American economic interests, and promised stability in a crucial area of the world." Id. at 231.
115. "The Congo was stable, and led by an anticommunist, pro-Western dictator who
supported American policies in the Cold War and promised to protect Western trade and in-
vestments. Id. at 34.
116. Nicaragua, through the Somoza dictatorship, "need[s] a firm hand to maintain or-
der, prevent communism, and protect American investments and trade in their nation." Id. at
182.
117. "It was widely known that the Iranian secret police, SAVAK, which had been cre-
ated and trained by the CIA, routinely used torture on political opponents, spied on and
harassed Iranian dissidents who lived overseas, and arrested people who were held in jail
without charges or trial." Id. at 172.
118. Id. at 3.
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litigation in U.S. courts will draw attention to these policies and force
the United States, particularly the executive branch, to adopt a more hu-
man rights friendly foreign policy. Since victims of human rights abuses
often have little legal recourse in their home countries, international hu-
man rights litigation provides an opportunity for foreign nationals to
vindicate their rights.
This position is normatively attractive. It could be argued that some
of the United States' polices did not further the United States' normative
or strategic interests and, in some cases, were counterproductive. My
aim is not to defend American foreign policy. Rather, I argue that given
the practical realities of international politics, the international system
does not always operate in a manner that reflects the universalist theory
of international law or the IR theories that underlie it. The United States
simply cannot always privilege international human rights concerns over
more immediate national security or strategic interests. International
human rights litigation can both complicate the achievement of national
security goals and the improvement of human rights practices. It creates
a cost that, in some cases, outweighs the potential benefits of the litiga-
tion.
b. Costs of International Human Rights Litigation
Some may challenge the contention that international human rights
litigation creates costs for American foreign policy. In some cases, the
United States, through the executive branch, has taken the position that
international human rights litigation under the ATS does not conflict
with American foreign policy goals." 9 For example, in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala 12 and Kadic v. Karadzic, ' among other cases, the United States
filed briefs in support of the plaintiffs, demonstrating that such litigation
would not complicate American foreign policy. 2  "[Tihe executive
branch took a hands-off position throughout the 1990s, apparently main-
taining the view, formally expressed in the Filartiga litigation, that
private litigation to vindicate international human rights does not harm
U.S. foreign policy or other national interests."'23 During the 1990s, the
United States often concluded that international human rights litigation
119. For a survey of major ATS cases and an examination of the Bush Administration's
position on international human rights litigation under the ATS, see Beth Stephens, Upsetting
Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169 (2004).
120. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
121. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
122. Stephens, supra note 119, at 185.
123. Id. at 177-78.
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facilitated the achievement of the United States' strategic and normative
interests.
However, the executive branch's support of international human
rights litigation in specific cases does not suggest that all such litigation
complements American foreign policy; rather, it suggests that the execu-
tive determined that, in some cases, the litigation complements the
United States' normative and strategic interests. It is unsurprising that
the executive branch did not object to international human rights litiga-
tion during the 1990s, the beginning of U.S. unipolar dominance of
international politics. The Soviet Union had disappeared, its satellite
States in Eastern Europe had moved toward democracy, and China was
in the early stages of its economic growth. The threat of terrorism and
nuclear proliferation were important but not primary foreign policy con-
cerns. During this period, the cases that survived motions to dismiss
"almost exclusively involved abuses committed under regimes that were
defunct and repudiated by their successors, nearly universally shunned
by other governments, possessed of, at best, uncertain claims to state-
hood or legitimate state power, lacking in geopolitical significance,
politically unimportant to Washington, or clearly condemned by the
United States."'24 In other words, the executive branch's support of inter-
national human rights litigation appeared to coincide with an assessment
that the litigation against insignificant, pariah States would generate
minimal costs for American foreign policy and might have some positive
effect on human rights practices.
This will not always be the case. The filing of international human
rights litigation directly implicates the executive branch's foreign affairs
prerogatives. First, the majority of ATS cases are dismissed on various
procedural grounds.'2 5 Despite this fact, the mere filing of litigation en-
gages American foreign policy without producing any tangible benefit
for the victims of human rights abuses. Second, even if international
human rights litigation were more successful, there is little evidence that
such litigation, by itself, results in an improvement of human rights prac-
tices in the targeted States.16 In fact, as I argue below, it may even
124. See Jacque deLisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A "Sini-
cal" Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 52 DEPAUL
L. REV. 473, 477-78 (2002) (emphasis added).
125. Stephens, supra note 119.
126. For a discussion of the efficacy of human rights treaties, see Oona Hathaway, Do
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002). Although empirical
evidence of the extraterritorial effects of international human rights litigation under the ATS
on state human rights practices is wanting, there is a growing literature about the positive
effects of human rights trials in transitional States. See generally NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA,
IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1995); NAOMI
ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECT: TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF HUMAN
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produce a backlash against the United States and the human rights norms
that the litigation promotes.
Finally, the threat of international human rights litigation against
American and foreign corporations may also provide States that prioi-
tize strategic interests-and do not try to impose human rights norms
and values on other States-with opportunities to challenge U.S. strate-
gic interests. For example, China builds relationships with States to
achieve its strategic interests regardless of their human rights record.
China has signed oil and natural gas deals with Iran, the Sudan, Angola,
Chad, Venezuela, and other States. China hosted a "China-Africa Sum-
mit" in late 2006 to build relationships with African leaders with the goal
of gaining access to natural resources. "China is picking up natural re-
sources----oil, precious minerals-to feed its expanding economy and
new markets for its burgeoning enterprises. The African countries get
investment and both parties are building political alliances in a world
they often see as overly dominated by the United States and other West-
ern powers.
Although human rights groups have heavily criticized China for its
human rights violations and support of autocratic regimes, "Chinese of-
ficials, however, insist that their country's involvement has improved the
lives of ordinary Africans without meddling in political affairs-strict
adherence to China's diplomatic policy of noninterference."'28 Since
States value sovereignty and the autonomy of their political order, they
may consider international human rights litigation in U.S. courts to be an
unreasonable interference into their domestic affairs, nudging them to-
ward the United States' strategic competitors for economic, political, and
military support.
The promotion of human rights, democracy, and basic civil liberties
is an integral part of American foreign policy. However, the legal
mechanisms to help achieve these goals should complement, not compli-
cate, the realization of both American national security and normative
interests. The current legal regime gives decisionmaking authority on the
consequences of international human rights litigation for the United
States to the branch with a minimal foreign affairs prerogative and insti-
tutional competency vis-A-vis the executive and legislative branches.
RIGHTS (2006); Juan E. Mendez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1, (A. James McAdams ed., 1997). For a con-
trary view, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 132
DAEDALUS 47 (2003); Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter
or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L Q. 777 (2007).





Over the long run, it is unwise to have international human rights
litigation in U.S. courts commit the executive branch to a specific nor-
mative vision of international politics when the executive branch has to
pursue U.S. national interests in a world sensitive to power. The interna-
tional system does not always operate according to the predictions of
social constructivism, democratic peace theory, and institutionalism.
Without some level of deference to the executive, international human
rights litigation might limit the United States' flexibility and increase the
cost of achieving normative and strategic interests.
IV. NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
Part of the logic of international human rights litigation relies on the
capacity of shared norms and social practices to encourage States and
individuals to internalize normative human rights practices. The values
embodied in international human rights law are universal and transcend
state, national, and cultural divisions. All people want to live free from
genocide and torture. International human rights litigation helps dis-
seminate and internalize universal, aspirational human rights norms.
While no reasonable person can quarrel with the normative desire to
rid the world of human rights violations, attempts to extraterritorially
impose universal values on weaker States with different cultural tradi-
tions may generate a backlash. Some States might view human rights
litigation in U.S. courts as yet another attempt by the United States to
impose its values on the international community. International human
rights litigation does not occur in a vacuum, divorced from the past
widespread and repeated use of international law to legitimate European
and American colonialism and imperialism, and violate the sovereignty
of weak States in Latin America, Africa and Asia. For centuries, western
great powers used international law to distinguish between "Christian
and barbaric" States and "civilized and uncivilized" nations to justify the
territorial occupation and colonial subjugation of many of the world's
non-European people. 9
International law was used as a tool to legitimate violations of sover-
eignty-colonialism-and protect the military and economic interests of
powerful States. During the nineteenth century, "when sovereignty was
generally accepted as fixed, stable and monolithic [for Western European
nations], colonial jurists self-consciously grasped the usefulness of
129. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004).
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keeping sovereignty undefined in order that it be extended or withdrawn
according to the requirements of [European] interests."30 In the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, "the nations of Europe competed in
the largest land grab in history (Africa) during the same period that the
United States was attempting to impose an international minimum stan-
dard of compensation for expropriation on Latin America."'' Since
international law represented the interests of colonial powers, more often
than not international law has been the enemy of weaker, non-Westem
States. For many of the targets of international human rights litigation,
the United States' attempts to impose "universal" values through litiga-
tion could be viewed as the evolution of nineteenth century territorial
imperialism to a twenty-first century moral imperialism. Given this his-
tory, international human rights litigation may generate a backlash and
encourage the rejection of the very values that the litigation promotes.
A. Nationalism
Nationalism is a highly contested term with no agreed definition or
shared conception of its development. For primordialists, nationalism is
tied to primordial ethnies or historical communities of people with
common identities, ideologies, and sentiments.'32 For constructivists, it is
the belief in an imagined political community, produced through the
confluence of specific cultural and historical forces in eighteenth century
Europe and replicated throughout the world.'33
Others focus on the nation and nationalism as a social discourse,
constantly being framed and reframed through shared social practices,
common histories, and myth-making."' Still others argue that national-
ism is no longer relevant in the modem world.' Regardless of its source,
nationalism appears to create a strong feeling of affective belonging that
results in an intense loyalty to the nation and State.
130. Id. at 89.
131. Kelly, supra note 79, at 540 n.358 (citing THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR
AFRICA: 1876-1912 (1991)).
132. See ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM IN A GLOBAL ERA (1995).
133. See, e.g., BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1991); ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONAL-
iSM (1983).
134. See, e.g., ROGERS BRUBAKER, NATIONALISM REFRAMED: NATIONHOOD AND THE
NATIONAL QUESTION IN THE NEW EUROPE (1996); NADIA ABu EL-HAJ, FACTS ON THE
GROUND: ARCHAEOLOGICAL PRACTICE AND TERRITORIAL SELF-FAsHIONING IN ISRAELI SOCI-
ETY (2001); INTELLECTUALS AND THE ARTICULATION OF THE NATION (Ronald Grigor Suny &
Michael Kennedy eds., 1999).




The creation and development of colonial nationalisms is most rele-
vant for understanding the connection between international human
rights litigation and the possible arousal of nationalistic sentiment. In the
colonial world, nationalist leaders had to develop narratives, histories,
and common resistance while subordinate to a colonial power.'36 The
governmental institutions and administrative policies of the colonial
powers clearly differentiated between the native and the foreign sover-
eign, creating the intellectual space to develop a nationalist
consciousness. Arab, Turkish, Chinese, and Indian nationalisms, along
with the various nationalisms that resulted in African independence
movements and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Empire, were
born under colonial subjugation.'37
The intensity of these nationalisms is constantly reinforced by the
contemporary European and American domination of the international
system, the perceived promotion of Western values as "universal," and
the perceived denigration of non-Western societies. It is not a specious
argument about the existence of authoritarian "Asian" values or intolerant
"Islamic" fundamentalism; rather, some regimes win favor with their citi-
zens and legitimate their rule by tapping into a nationalist discourse of
resistance against the former colonial occupiers. States may manipulate
the mere existence of international human rights litigation to strengthen
their political position. Unfortunately, this may result in citizens reject-
ing the substance of normative human rights practices because of the
form of their introduction-litigation in the distant court of a self-
interested foreign power perceived to be imposing its values on the in-
ternational community.
B. Nationalism and China
China provides an excellent example of the potential of international
human rights litigation to generate strong nationalistic fervor and affect
Sino-American relations. With the demise of Maoist communism as a
governing ideology, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has turned
to nationalism to legitimate its rule.' Through a combination of
136. See PARTHA CHATTERJEE, NATIONALIST THOUGHT AND THE COLONIAL WORLD: A
DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE (1986).
137. See, e.g., PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND
POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES (1993); PETER HAYS GRIES, CHINA'S NEW NATIONALISM: PRIDE,
POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY (2005); SUISHENG ZHAO, A NATION-STATE BY CONSTRUCTION:
DYNAMICS OF MODERN CHINESE NATIONALISM (2004); THE ORIGINS OF ARAB NATIONALISM
(Rashid Khalidi ed., 1993).
138. See Yongnian Zheng, Nationalism, Globalism, and China's International Relations,
in CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DYNAMICS OF PARADIGM
SHIFTS 93 (Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan & Daojiong Zha eds., 2000); Suisheng Zhao, A
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victimization, humiliation, and insecurity, Chinese nationalism serves as
a reminder of past struggles, a memory of Western domination, and a
unifying force for national aspirations of greatness.'39 The CCP has
"played up a history of painful Chinese weakness in the face of Western
imperialism, territorial division, unequal treaties, invasion, anti-Chinese
racism, and social chaos, because the regime has to claim legitimization
based on its ability to defend China's territorial integrity and to build a
modern Chinese nation-state. ''1 4o
The CCP has also introduced patriotic "education" campaigns to en-
courage nationalism. Since "Chinese national identity ... evolves in part
through China's interactions with the [United States] ... [it] is both lim-
ited and enabled by evolving Chinese narratives about past Sino-
American encounters.",14' The need for confidence in national self image
and China's international status creates a particular sensitivity to inten-
tional or perceived insults by the United States. Opposition to China's
initial bid for the 2000 Olympics, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy
in Belgrade, and the EP-3 spy plane incident represent a continuation of
humiliations against China and diminish China's desired international
status. International human rights litigation against former Premier Li
Peng4 2 and former Beijing Mayor Liu Qi, among others, only contrib-
utes to this feeling.'
43
For China and States in Africa and the volatile and strategically im-
portant Middle East, international human rights litigation may
exacerbate nationalism and entrench existing human rights practices as a
symbolic rejection of the United States and its perceived moral imperial-
ism. The States that are likely to be targeted for human rights
violations-almost all of the Middle East and many States in Africa-
are often those with a long history of subjugation under colonialism. In-
ternational human rights litigation in U.S. courts may resemble yet
another attempt by a self-interested powerful State to impose its values
State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China, 31
COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 287 (1998).
139. See generally GRIES, supra note 137.
140. ZHAO, supra note 137, at 35.
141. See GRIES, supra note 137, at 55.
142. Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000).
143. For an examination of Chinese responses to international human rights litigation,
see deLisle, supra note 124. Jacque deLisle recognizes the strong reaction of the Chinese
government to U.S. interference in its domestic affairs through international human rights
litigation, but suggests that the Chinese understand that judicial opinions are not equivalent to
executive determinations of policy. Assuming, arguendo, that this is accurate, it does not viti-
ate the argument that the Chinese government can manipulate the litigation internally to




on foreign societies, weakening the limited efficacy of the litigation, and
encouraging nationalistic sentiments.
V. OBJECTIONS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS
The principal objections to this Article will likely focus on my de-
scription of international politics and the possibility of international
human rights litigation complicating American foreign policy. Though
they are related objections, the former relates to IR theory and the latter
concerns the extant legal regime for international human rights litigation.
This section addresses these and other counterarguments.
A. Conception of International Politics
1. Wrong IR Theory?
I do not argue that a particular conception of IR is always correct;
rather, I suggest that social constructivism, democratic peace theory, and
institutionalism do not explain all state behavior. Using a framework
more sensitive to the role of power and national self-interest in interna-
tional politics, I conclude that federal incorporation of CIL generates
sovereignty costs and international human rights litigation complicates
American foreign policy. However, this conclusion relies on the view that
there is some role for power and self-interest in explaining state behavior
in international politics. If power and self-interest have little explanatory
value, my concern about federal incorporation of CIL and international
human rights litigation may be misplaced.
Some may argue that the changes in the structure of the international
system, the rise of democratic governments, and the growing discourse
about shared norms, human rights, and the rule of law demonstrate that
power and self-interest no longer explain state behavior in international
politics. Economic interdependence,'" globalization, and the specter of
nuclear annihilation make a great power war both extremely expensive
and potentially catastrophic. Human trafficking, environmental degrada-
tion, the rise of non-state actors, nuclear proliferation, economic
integration-issues relevant in the post-Cold War world-all require co-
ordinated, multinational efforts to resolve. The World Trade
Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the
United Nations-along with other public and private actors-intrude on
144. But see E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939 (1939); MEARSHEIMER,
supra note 50, at 371; WALTZ, supra note 50 (arguing that economic interdependence by itself
has not prevented security competition or military conflict between states with shared eco-
nomic interests but conflicting security concerns).
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state sovereignty and play an increasingly prominent role in international
politics. These developments portend an era of multilateralism, institu-
tions, and international law to resolve the international community's
most pressing issues. Consequently, we see the establishment of more
than fifty international judicial bodies, the majority of which emerged
over the past 30 years, 45 and the judicialization of international institu-
tions through arbitration and international dispute resolution
mechanisms.",
The main problem with this argument is that these developments are
still consistent with a vision of international politics that allows a role for
power and self-interest. Powerful States often create international institu-
tions to reflect the underlying distribution of power in international
politics and lower the cost of managing international order. Institutions
operate in the interests of their creators and, if they fail to do so, the in-
stitutions are sometimes ignored. In the security context, the United
States' decisions to ignore or circumvent the United Nations Security
Council in Kosovo (President Clinton) and more recently in Iraq (Presi-
dent George W. Bush) are consistent with self-interested state behavior.
Similarly, multilateral efforts to address environmental pollution and
terrorism also reflect national self-interest.
The United States engages international law in a similar manner. The
United States routinely withdraws from multilateral treaties or attaches
reservations to prevent their application within the American legal sys-
tem.' 7 Despite the proliferation of international judicial bodies, the
United States also circumvents the power of international courts by re-
fusing to join-the International Criminal Court, 148 for example--or by
signing bilateral agreements with States to exempt American citizens
from their respective jurisdictions. These policies reflect the United
States' power advantage in international politics and national self-
interest in compliance with international law. The new challenges that
States face in the post-Cold War world and the mechanisms that power-
ful States use to manage international order do not reflect a fundamental
change in international politics; power considerations and national self-
interest still have a role to play.
145. See Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Inter-
national Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. Soc'Y. INT'L L. PRoc. 160 (2000).
146. Id.
147. See generally Spiro, supra note 89.
148. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89 (2003)
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2. The Universalist Theory Reflected in American Foreign Policy?
Some may argue that the United States has always prioritized de-
mocracy, human rights, and rule of law as the most important elements
of American foreign policy. The United States was the driving force be-
hind the creation of international institutions to manage world affairs and
encourage multilateralism: the League of Nations, the United Nations,
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade
Organization. As the leader of the free world, the United States con-
fronted the Soviet Union, assisted the former Warsaw Pact countries in
their transitions to democracy, and encouraged democratic governance in
Latin America. Through the State Department, the United States regu-
larly criticizes states for failing to improve poor human rights practices
or ensure basic civil liberties for their citizens. More than any other
country, the United States works to spread democracy, normative human
rights practices, and respect for the rule of law. American foreign policy,
at its core, reflects the universalist theory and the IR theories that under-
lie it. Federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights
litigation are consistent with this vision.
Despite this evidence, the universalist theory fails to show a connec-
tion between its foundational IR assumptions about international politics
and the prioritization of security and strategic interests present in Ameri-
can foreign policy. For at least the majority of the twentieth century,1
4 9
realism' ° has been the dominant paradigm for understanding state be-
havior in international politics.'"' With some exceptions, it was the
149. Many scholars argue that realism also explains U.S. behavior in the international
system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For an extended discussion of the realist
basis of U.S. foreign policy in the nineteenth century, see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER LAYNE, THE
PEACE OF ILLUSIONS: AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY FROM 1940 TO THE PRESENT 27-38
(2006); MEARSHEIMER, supra note 50, at 146, 238-250; FAREED ZAKARIA, FROM WEALTH TO
POWER: THE UNUSUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE (1998). For alternative explana-
tions of the United States' expansionist foreign policy in the late nineteenth century, see Colin
Dueck, The Sources of American Expansion, 11 SEC. STUD. 171 (2001).
150. I take no position on whether realism should have been the dominant paradigm. It is
important to note that realism is not a theory of foreign policy; it explains outcomes in interna-
tional politics. Realism does not explain particular policy positions, for example the United
States' support of a right-wing dictatorship in Pakistan over a democratic India during the
Cold War, but can explain broader trends like prioritization of U.S. material power and strate-
gic interests over humanitarian and moral concerns.
151. However, realism has a long history in political and philosophical thought. Kau-
tilya's ARTHASHASTRA, Machiavelli's THE PRINCE, Thucydides's THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR,
Hobbes's LEVIATHAN, Sun Tzu's THE ART OF WAR, and the writings of Han Fei articulate
normative theories and descriptive accounts of the optimal use of power to achieve political
ends in both domestic and "international" politics. Although these theorists do not use the
language of contemporary IR theory, their assumptions about the role of power and state be-
havior are instructive. For them, states pursue their self-interest through the accumulation,
preservation, and maximization of power.
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dominant theory in the American foreign policy establishment52 during
the Cold War.'53 From 1945 to 1989, the United States operated in a
manner generally consistent with realism, focusing on the development
of American economic and military strength (material power to achieve
security) and support of anticommunist regimes to balance and contain
the Soviet Union in a bipolar international system.
American foreign policy has reflected the difficult tension between
competing normative and strategic goals. In a number of circumstances,
Republican and Democratic administrations have made the difficult de-
cision to prioritize the United States' security interests over promoting
human rights. Although in a perfect world the pursuit of normative inter-
ests would always be preferable, the United States sometimes has
immediate security and strategic concerns that require difficult compro-
mises. The absence of a central enforcement mechanism forces States to
ensure their security before pursuing normative goals. This painful com-
promise is likely to continue.
One might respond that the post-Cold War era is an opportunity for
the United States to turn away from its history of self-interested power
politics. Social constructivism,1 4 institutionalism,'55 and democratic
peace theory 56 began to challenge realism's dominance in IR theory and
in the foreign policy establishment after the end of the Cold War. Ameri-
can foreign policy seemed to focus on human rights and the rule of law
as primary concerns. As President Clinton stated:
We can then say to the people of the world, whether you live in
Africa, or Central Europe, or any other place, if somebody
comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse be-
cause of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and
it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it.'57
However, American foreign policy did not conform completely with
its rhetoric. While the U.S. military acted in Somalia and Haiti, humani-
tarian interventions that "reflected no traditional notion of American
152. George P. Kennan, Paul T. Nitze, Henry F. Kissinger, and Brent Scowcroft, among
others, were all realists. Scholars Nicholas Spykman, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans J. Morgenthau,
and Kenneth Waltz provided some of the theoretical underpinnings for realism as an IR theory.
153. For a detailed analyses of U.S. foreign policy's realist foundations and the history
of the Cold War, see, e.g., JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL OF AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR (2005); JOHN LEWIS
GADDIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR (1992); LAYNE, supra note
149.
154. See sources cited supra note 34 and accompanying text.
155. See sources cited supra note 41.
156. See sources cited supra note 38.
157. HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY: TOWARD A DIPLO-
MACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 253-54 (2001) (internal citation omitted).
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national interest in the sense that their outcome could in no way affect
any historic definition of American security,"'' 8 the United States also
ignored the Russian crackdown in Chechnya, the atrocities in Rwanda,"
Sierra Leone, the Sudan, and the Caucasus-all conflicts that generated
large numbers of civilian deaths and casualties and gross human rights
violations. This tension in American foreign policy begs the question:
If the Clinton Doctrine required aiding the victims of brutality in
Kosovo, why did it not in Rwanda, Chechnya, Tibet, Iraq, the
Sudan or Sierre Leone? The application of universal principles
on so selective a basis could help but raise questions about what
the standards for selection were to be and whether expediency as
much as morality determined them.'60
Again, this is a description rather than an indictment or a defense of the
United States or its foreign policy. In an international system without a
central enforcement mechanism that is sensitive to the role of power, the
United States has made the difficult decision of privileging strategic in-
terests over human rights concerns to achieve national interests.
Finally, after the terrible events of September 11, 2001, the United
States has allied itself with dictatorships that share the United States'
strategic interests-in this case, a common opposition to Al-Qaeda and
affiliated terrorist groups-but reject democracy and engage in human
rights violations. As I noted earlier, the United States courted the
Musharraf dictatorship in Pakistan and the repressive Central Asian
Republics as allies against Al-Qaeda in the War on Terror. The United
States supports autocratic regimes in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
and Egypt. With some exceptions, it has been relatively silent about
Russian human right violations in Chechnya, Chinese human rights
violations in Tibet, and Turkish human rights violations against the
Kurds.
Expressions of concern from embattled Chechens and Tibetans
virtually disappeared. The old Cold War habit of determining
allies solely by their effectiveness in fighting a common threat
158. Id. at 255.
159. For a discussion of the U.S. attempts to avoid involvement in Rwanda and other
genocides, see SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE (2002).
160. John L. Gaddis, Order versus Justice: An American Foreign Policy Dilemma, in
ORDER AND JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 155, 167 (Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis &
Andrew Hurrell eds., 2003) (emphasis added).
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[returned] and, as a consequence, the demands of stability ap-
peared, once again, to have trumped those of equity." '
The U.S. occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the broader War on Ter-
ror, the likelihood of a continued U.S. presence in the Middle East, the
increasing prominence of non-state actors, the United States' security
commitments in East Asia, the long-term prospect of new rising powers
in the international system (China), and the exigencies of international
politics suggest that the United States will be forced, at times, to privi-
lege strategic interests over human rights concerns. My framework
incorporates these considerations in providing a more nuanced evalua-
tion of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights
litigation. In contrast, the universalist theory relies on an aspirational
conception of international politics.
B. International Human Rights Litigation and Foreign Policy
Perhaps concerns about federal incorporation of CIL and interna-
tional human rights litigation are overblown. It could be that federal
judges are capable of making similar determinations about the conse-
quences of international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. They
have dismissed claims that were not based on specific, binding, or
obligatory CIL norms and have only allowed claims for gross violation
of human rights to proceed.'62 Judicial procedural safeguards, including
forum non conveniens 63 and foreign sovereign immunity,' 64 protect po-
tential defendants.' 65 Moreover, the executive branch can intervene if
litigation threatens or compromises the United States' security or strate-
gic interests. Thus, it could be argued that the current regime is
sufficient.
1. Is the Existing Regime Sufficient?
Given the new CIL's unclear methodology and content, it is difficult
to limit'6 the types of cases and the opportunities for disruption that in-
ternational human rights litigation may produce. Despite Sosa and its
specific, universal, and obligatory standard, the next wave of interna-
161. Id. at 170.
162. See Stephens, supra note 119.
163. See Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Con-
veniens in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 41 (1998).
164. For a discussion of sovereign immunity and its implications for ATS litigation, see
Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505 (2008).
165. For a discussion of the procedural obstacles for ATS litigation, see Kathryn L.
Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts: Enforcing Human Rights at the Corpo-
rate Level, BYU L. REV. 1139 (1999).
166. See Sohn, supra note 80, at 399.
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tional human rights litigation under the ATS will likely focus on corpo-
rate activities and, according to some, challenge executive branch
foreign policy decisions.' 6 This could severely complicate the pursuit of
the national interest, particularly when the United States makes the diffi-
cult decision to subordinate its normative goals to achieve more
immediate national security or strategic interests.
As others have noted,'6' the federal judiciary is not best suited to de-
termine amorphous, indeterminate new CIL norms on a case-by-case
basis.'69 First, the new CIL's methodological incoherence and rapidly
changing content are so contested that seasoned scholars of international
law strongly disagree about how to identify or even determine the exis-
tence of many purportedly universal new CIL norms.'70 Second, federal
judges "have, at most, a superficial familiarity with the theory of law
creation in the international legal system and only the vaguest notion of
how the system functions."'' Third, federal judges also lack appropriate
guidance as "neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure make reference to methods or requirements for
pleading or proving customary international law in United States
courts.' 72 This is not a criticism of the capacity of U.S. federal judges;
rather, it is a description of the new CIL's unclear methodology and the
difficulties that federal judges face in adjudicating international human
rights claims.
2. Litigation Encourages Positive Human Rights Practices?
Advocates of international human rights litigation concede that the
enforcement of successful judgments under the ATS is difficult. How-
ever, international human rights litigation brings attention to violations
of human rights law, provides victims with an opportunity to vindicate
their rights in court, and encourages the creation of institutions to pre-
vent future human rights violations. International human rights litigation
encourages the adoption of normative human rights practices.
167. See Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on Terrorism,
19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 105, 105-06 (2005).
168. See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional
Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. 153.
169. Harold G. Maier, The Role of Experts in Proving International Human Rights Law
in Domestic Courts: A Commentary, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 205 (1996) (noting that
federal judges sorely lack the requisite knowledge about the substance and formation of inter-
national law and advocating the use of expert witnesses in international law cases).
170. Kelly, supra note 79.
171. Maier, supra note 169, at 205.
172. Id. at 205.
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Though empirical work on the effects of human rights treaties on
state behavior exists,' there is little evidence of a specific causal rela-
tionship between international human rights litigation in U.S. courts and
changes in the domestic legal regimes or the behavior of targeted States.
International human rights litigation is unlikely to have more than a neg-
ligible effect, by itself, on actual state practices and may stunt the
adoption of the normative practices that it promotes.
If successful, international human rights litigation provides judg-
ments that are rarely enforced. While the opportunity to be heard may
have a healing value for the plaintiffs, a decision by a U.S. court, far re-
moved from the country in which the human rights violations occurred
and the perpetrators reside, is only symbolic. Given the limited capacity
of international human rights litigation to affect state practice, such hol-
low victories may actually expose some of the weaknesses of
international law and an international judicial system without a central
enforcement mechanism.
It is also unclear whether the citizens of target States have any inde-
pendent knowledge of the litigation. Even if we assume that they do, it is
unlikely that these unenforced, symbolic victories in U.S. courts pene-
trate deeply into the target States' populations, weakening social
constructivist arguments that international human rights litigation, by
itself, can socialize States, acculturate individuals, and encourage shared
norms and practices.
Finally, international human rights litigation in U.S. courts may ac-
tually delay the acceptance of preferred human rights practices. As noted
earlier, such litigation can be manipulated to generate a nationalistic re-
sponse-framing it as yet another attempt by the United States to impose
its "universal" values on the international community. Whatever their
failings, the United Nations, human rights groups, international institu-
tions, and non-governmental organizations have more legitimacy in the
international community to encourage respect for human rights than a
U.S. federal district court. Many have a presence within the borders of
States where violations are likely to occur and have much better access
to the populace. Since they do not necessarily appear as appendages of
the United States, such groups are also less likely to generate a national-
istic backlash. International human rights litigation may very well
complicate the efforts of the organizations best-placed to achieve con-
crete human rights improvements.




Federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litiga-
tion relies on a universalist theory of international law. The universalist
theory is rooted in specific IR theories and drives a project to incorporate
international law into the American legal system, develop a global legal
architecture, and use U.S. courts to encourage progressive change. Fed-
eral incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation are
incremental steps toward that goal.
However, a broader consideration of IR and a competing theory of
state compliance based on power and self-interest generates a framework
that demonstrates that federal incorporation of CIL also creates sover-
eignty costs, and that international human rights litigation will
complicate the realization of the United States' normative and strategic
interests. The argument is not a rejection of universal human rights and
the rule of law. It simply suggests that the universalist legal theory is
driven by IR theories that minimize the role of power and national self-
interest in international politics.
Beyond the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, addressing these con-
cerns may require congressional action to define the international law
norms actionable under the ATS and provide guidance on the delicate
balance between the pursuit of U.S. interests in a world sensitive to
power and the concurrent commitment of the United States to interna-
tional human rights litigation. One example of such action within foreign
relations law is the shift from the Tate Letter regime on governing the
executive's case-by-case determinations of sovereign immunity to the
passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which codified the
sovereign immunity standard for the judiciary.74 Another is the Torture
Victim Protection Act, which specifies the procedural and substantive
rules for bringing torture claims under international law in U.S. federal
courts.'75 However, in the absence of contemporary congressional action
to address the concerns outlined here for international human rights liti-
gation under the ATS, this Article implicitly endorses an incremental
expansion of executive branch decision-making authority vis-A-vis the
judiciary for international human rights litigation.
174. For a discussion of the background and motivations for the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act, see Michael D. Murray, Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act for Nazi Crimes of Plunder and Expropriation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 223
(2004).
175. For an introduction to the Torture Victim Protection Act, see Robert F. Drinan, S.J.
& Teresa T. Kuo, Putting the World's Oppressors on Trial: The Torture Victim Protection Act,
15 Hum. RTS. Q. 605 (1993).
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For various reasons, the executive is institutionally best-suited to de-
termine the United States' strategic and normative interests; develop the
appropriate foreign policy to achieve those goals; and evaluate wisdom
of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation
under the ATS. The executive branch can best determine whether federal
incorporation of CIL generates high sovereignty costs for the United
States. It also has the institutional competence, prerogatives, and re-
sources to determine whether international human rights litigation will
negatively affect the executive branch in its pursuit of strategic interests,
calibrate the United States' position on specific international human
rights litigation with ongoing diplomatic overtures, and coordinate the
collection and analysis of information to determine the best course of
action. Finally, the executive, unlike the judiciary, is directly politically
accountable. These factors suggest that a slight movement along the con-
tinuum of existing judicial deference toward the executive branch-
perhaps in the form of judicial review of executive determinations on
specific litigation under an arbitrary and capricious, abuse of discretion,
or reasonableness standard-is warranted for international human rights
litigation under the ATS.
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